“The complainants further insist that the relevant investigation is a potential impact rather than an actual impact on federal dominance. We agree. However, the multilateral nature of the Agreement and the establishment of a permanent administrative body do not in themselves constitute a significant risk of conflict with the principles underlying the clause of the Covenant. The number of contracting parties is irrelevant if it does not unacceptably strengthen the power of the state at the expense of federal supremacy. With regard to the powers conferred on the administrative body, we believe that they must also be evaluated with regard to strengthening the power of the State vis-à-vis the federal Government. See Virginia v. Tennessee, op. cit. cit., p. 520 (creation of a commission to implement the border, not a “pact”). We therefore turn to the application of Virginia v. Tennessee reigns until the pact before us. The legal environment of the covenants involves a fusion of the texts of the covenants and the jurisprudence of federal and state courts across the country.
Since there are relatively few court decisions that establish legal principles in a particular court or for a particular clause, courts often consider other federal and state court decisions for their interpretation and application of a convention. The courts also use the texts of other covenants and the corresponding case law for generally applicable principles of compact law. Given the complexity of the legal bases and the pervasive and appropriate use of the covenants, it is important that judges and court staff understand the law of intergovernmental covenants. The term pact is most often applied to agreements between States or nations on issues in which they have a common concern. Once Congress approves a pact, it changes from a treaty between governments to a U.S. law.1FootnoteSee Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981). See also Texas v.
New Mexico, No. 141, Orig., Slip op. cit. to 4 (United States 5 March 2018); Kansas v. Nebraska, 574 U.S. 445, 456 n.5 (2015); Tarrant Reg`l Water Dist. Herrmann, 569 U.S. 614, 628 n.8 (2013); Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 351 (2010); Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987); Hochzeit v.
Meyler, 192 U.S. 573, 582 (1904); Pennsylvania v Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. 518, 566 (1851). As federal law, a pact approved by Congress anticipates conflicting state laws,2FootnoteSee e.g., Tarrant Reg`l Water Dist., 569 U.S. at 627–28 (analysis of whether the Red River Compact anticipated Oklahoma water allocation laws). and no court may order an appeal inconsistent with its provisions.3FootnoteSee e.g., New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 811 (1999); Culyer, 449 U.S. at 438; Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 565–66 (1963); Washington v. Oregon, 211 U.S.
127, 135 (1908). The Supreme Court has held that boundaries established by interstate treaties authorized by Congress bind state citizens and are conclusive in terms of their rights.4 Footnote, see, for example, Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 525 (1893); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 725 (1838); Poole v. Fleeger, 36 U.S. 185, 209–10 (1837).
The Court has also held that treaties that distribute waters equitably between states can affect private property rights.5FootnoteSee Hinderlid v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 104–06 (1938). As indicated in the introduction and explained in this chapter, intergovernmental covenants are not mere agreements between States that are subject to narrow interpretation or selective application. At first sight, these are statutory treaties that bind Member States, including the authorities, officials and citizens concerned, to a set of agreed principles and agreements. It is not a set of recommended practices or discretionary suggestions that are easy to ignore. In addition, they are not uniform, model-based or proposed state laws, or administrative arrangements between agencies or law enforcement officials. Understanding the unique importance of intergovernmental contracts in the U.S. legal system is an important predicate for the correct application of the Compact`s terms and conditions, which can prevent legal risks in the performance of their contractual obligations. “The requirement for congressional approval is at the heart of the Covenant clause. By giving Congress the power to grant or deny consent, or to condition consent on states` compliance with certain conditions, the drafters sought to ensure that Congress would retain final oversight of cooperative government action that might otherwise interfere with the full and free exercise of federal power. Congress approval is not required for intergovernmental agreements that do not fall within the scope of the Covenant clause.
If an agreement is not intended to form a combination of increasing political power in states that could harm or disrupt the just supremacy of the United States, it does not fall within the scope of the clause and is not declared invalid due to lack of congressional approval. However, if Congress has authorized states to enter into a cooperation agreement, and where the subject matter of that agreement is an appropriate subject matter for congressional legislation, the consent of Congress converts the states` agreement into federal law under the covenant clause. Congress may approve an intergovernmental compact by approving in advance joint government action or by expressly or implicitly accepting an agreement to which states have already acceded. “Article 1, § 10, Kl. Article 1 of the Constitution – the clause of the treaty – states: “No State may enter into a treaty, alliance or confederation.” However, Article I, § 10, cl. 3 – the clause of the Covenant – allows states to conclude agreements or pacts as long as the consent of Congress is obtained. The drafters clearly perceived pacts and agreements as departing from treaties. However, the minutes of the Constitutional Convention contain no indication of the precise contours of the agreements and treaties governed by the clause of the Covenant. This suggests that the drafters used the words contract, pact and agreement as artificial terms for which no explanation was required and with which we are not familiar. Further evidence that the editors attributed exact meanings to these words can be found in contemporary commentaries.
“That was the status of the Virginia v. test. Tennessee until two terms ago, when we decided New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U. S. 363 (1976). In this case, we applied the specific test and found that an intergovernmental agreement that establishes an old boundary does not require congressional approval. We told Justice Field that “the application of the Covenant clause is limited to agreements to form a combination of political power in states that would or could undermine the just supremacy of the United States.” This rule strikes the right balance between federal and state power in terms of interstate covenants and agreements. The Constitution contains the Compact Clause, which prohibits a state from entering into a treaty with another state without congressional approval.
If private litigants are parties to covenant cases, the prosecutions do not fall within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but they can still be heard by federal courts because they require the interpretation of treaties in their federal statute.12Footnote, for example, Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 439 (1981). A clause that allows a state entity to sue and be sued waives the sovereign immunity of the state under the Eleventh Amendment and may allow a private party to sue a state entity.13FootnoteSee Petty v. Tenn.-Mo. Bridge Comm`n, 359 U.S. 275, 278–82 (1959). For a discussion of sovereign state immunity and the 11th Amendment, see.
The terms “agreement” or “contract” are in themselves broad enough to cover all forms of written or oral provisions relating to all types of subjects; against those against whom the United States has no objection or interest in intervening, as well as those who tend to increase and strengthen the political influence of States Parties in order to compromise or compromise the hegemony of the United States or to impede its legitimate administration of certain matters under its control. 148 U.S., pp. 517-518. The Supreme Court has the ultimate power to rule on the meaning and validity of an alliance.6FootnoteSee for example, Nebraska v. Iowa, 406 U.S. 117, 118 n.1 (1972); Petty v. Tenn.-Mo. Bridge Comm`n, 359 U.S. 275, 278 (1959); West Virginia ex rel. Sims, 341 U.S.
22, 28 (1951). The Court need not submit to the views of the national courts on the conformity of a Covenant with the law of the States which have acceded to it.