This passage faithfully reflects Socrates` argument. Chief Justice Marshall`s reasoning can be expressed in the form of a categorical standard syllogism: the last type of argument (according to Huhn`s framework) is the policy-based argument. This is perhaps the most controversial type of argument. It is a question of advocating the application of certain rules because they are good policies or, conversely, opposing the application of certain rules because they are bad. This type of reasoning is controversial because some people think lawyers and judges should not be involved in policy-making, but the practical reality is that political arguments are widely used in law and are often critical in the most controversial cases. Because of their controversial nature, and especially because of the widespread disagreement over preferred valuation theories, political arguments are often attacked. Huhn suggests that there are six main methods of attack: As I said, this argument is a subjunctive syllogism. The same reasoning can be presented as a disjunctive syllogism in the second humor when the first premise is changed to read: “Ernest Hemingway was born in Idaho or Illinois.” The resulting disjunctive syllogism would be valid because disjunctions are mutually exclusive. The general form of the previous arguments is as follows: I would just like to make one final point about the previous arguments. Because of the way they work – drawing analogies between the factual models of two or more cases – this type of reasoning requires an established view of the facts of the case. You must agree that the present case has certain characteristics and that the previous one has certain characteristics. If the facts are disputed or differ from what the judge or lawyer claims, this may block the application of the previous judgment. Thus, this type of argument combines a defense of the main premise of the legal argument with an implicit defense of the secondary premise.
It was a very interesting read, thank you very much for the report. I have two proposals on substance and two and a half proposals on form that can still improve it; From the beginning, when you show the general abstract form of a legal argument, your use of “(or not)” can be interpreted to mean that the consequences do not follow if the conditions are not met. However, since your premise is “If A, then B” and not “If and only if A, then B”, this interpretation would be a false counterposition. I`m pretty sure you know this distinction and it`s just a small point, I just thought it might be beneficial to be more specific. If you explain the concept of ejusdem generis, the wording is not quite correct, although I would say that what you mean is clear. There are no “other members of this list”. Perhaps you write something like “[if the items in a non-exhaustive list are of a particular type, then] it is assumed that the rule that uses that list also applies to all other members of that TYPE.” The first method of attacking a political argument should be a bullet, like the others. In the paragraph mentioning “Reference AG (No. 6 of 1980)”, there is no “not”. « […] but this case [NOT] fell within those exceptions. (Maybe search and replace to change all instances of double spaces to one space.) In deductive arguments, the premises, if true, are treated as conclusive reasons for the veracity of the conclusion, that is, the conclusion must be true or necessarily true. The inference force of the relationship between premises and conclusions is necessarily.
As law has become a more text-based discipline, with formal procedures for drafting and enacting legislation, the importance of customary or tradition-based rules has diminished. Instead of referring to customs, we point to texts to find the rules that govern our cases. Nevertheless, customary law is an integral part of law in some areas. In contract law, for example, it is common to use the customs of certain professions or places to determine what the terms of a contract should be. Similarly, in international law, the habitual conduct of States among themselves is one of the main sources of law. Finally, and perhaps most notoriously, there is no written constitution in the United Kingdom. Instead, there is a set of customary rules and norms that dictate how the state should be run. They are the main source of constitutional law in the United Kingdom. As with analogy arguments, there are no formal errors associated with inductive generalization reasoning. However, there are three named errors that are commonly identified with reasoning in the model of a generalized inductive conclusion: The conventional view seems to be that the main difference between common law reasoning and civil law reasoning is that civil lawyers usually start with the principle and then try to apply it to the facts in question (deductive reasoning), but that ordinary lawyers do it the other way around (inductive reflection). In my opinion, this is exaggerated at best and all lawyers use both types of reasoning. Feedback? Conclusions they draw: The first mood denies the truth of one disjunction in its second premise and then confirms in its conclusion the truth of the other; The second agreement confirms the truth of one disjunction in the second premise and then concludes that the other disjunction must be false.
Only the first mood is in a purely logical sense a disjunctive syllogism. The second chord, in its disjunctive premise, presupposes a sentence more complex than a simple disjunctive sentence. Nevertheless, in some situations of legal argumentation, arguments arise in the second mood. When they do, they are usually represented as simple disjunctive syllogisms. In this two-part article, I want to explore some of the complexities of legal arguments. I do this first by looking at the different types of arguments you can make for or against certain legal rules (i.e. for and against the main premise of the legal argument). Understanding these types of arguments is the main function of legal education. People who study law at universities or professional schools spend a lot of time researching all the different ways lawyers try to prove that a particular rule should apply to a particular issue. The first book on legal argumentation, which she systematically addresses in relation to the logics and philosophies of practical reason This argument is valid.
But it`s not solid. The logical form of the argument coincides exactly with the form of the arguments of Socrates and Bevans. The three arguments begin with a universal affirmative categorical sentence, followed by two specific affirmative categorical sentences (AII sequence of categorical statements). The terms in the arguments also take the same positions. Although all three arguments follow the same form (which happens to be valid), the night parrot argument is obviously problematic. His problem lies in lying; Its main premise or secondary premise is not true. And the conclusion is absurd. However, the absence of truth does not affect the validity of the argument. It is valid, but due to the fact that its main premise is false, the argument is baseless. Many jurists fear that the recognition of logic as central to law risks provoking a return to the rationalist excesses of formalist jurisprudence that spread in 19th century legal thought.
For it is against this formalist tradition that the jurists of legal realism, together with their colleagues of the free law of the European continent, directed much of their critical energies at the beginning of the 20th century.